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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine the patterns of behaviour of companies from 
former socialist countries related to the application of good corporate 
governance practices. We try to assess the level of transparency and 
to determine if there are any factors that systematically influence 
corporate behaviour in this regard. Using a sample of 145 companies 
from Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia and Serbia, we apply Standard 
& Poor’s (S&P) methodology for assessment of transparency and 
disclosure levels and find that the companies in these countries 
generally lag in terms of transparency behind their peers worldwide 
as measured one decade ago. Additionally, using the same sample, 
we apply a regression analysis and conclude that the level of 
transparency is positively related to the size of the company and the 
need for external financing, but negatively to the concentration of 
ownership and we also observe important country effects. We do not 
find a statistically significant relationship between transparency and 
profitability and relate this finding with the prevailing attitude of the 
companies towards the stock market. Having in mind the different 
scores by country and by area of disclosure, we believe that there is 
still scope for improvement using proper advising and public policy 
measures.
1. Introduction
There has been a lot of research on the issue of corporate transparency, analysing the costs 
and benefits that the higher degree of transparency generates to a company and its share-
holders. Starting from the value maximisation proposition, the prevailing line of thought 
is that disclosure is beneficial from the point of view of company valuation, although these 
findings are based on different grounds: lower investors’ uncertainty (Durnev & Kim, 2005; 
Hail, 2002; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999) increased market interest (Lang, Lins, & Maffett, 
2012), better protection of investor rights (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Östberg, 2006); 
lower cost of capital (Botosan, 2006; Frost, Gordon, & Pownall, 2005), etc. Lai, Liu, and 
Wang (2014) find that increased disclosure reduces information asymmetry, which induces 
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managers to act in the best interest of shareholders, and increases the overall efficiency of 
investments made on the capital market.
On the other hand, research on a sample of Australian companies showed no relationship 
between the quality and sustainability of a firm’s transparency and its default risk, i.e., its 
cost of external financing (James-Overheu & Cotter, 2009). Enhanced transparency creates 
unsolicited pressure on the managers whose work is monitored more closely by the market 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 2007), the controlling shareholders lose their informational advan-
tage and thus the appeal of their position weakens (Berglöf & Pajuste, 2005), and it also 
increases the costs to the initial owners in case of a future sale of the business (Verrecchia, 
2001). Farhi, Lerner, and Tirole (2013) warn that transparency resulting from product 
certification provides benefits for the competitors. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) also point 
to the mixed international evidence on the benefits from increased transparency.
In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (C.E.E.), where the majority of the joint-
stock companies account for the recently privatised former socialist enterprises, there has 
been a lack of both the awareness of the need and the willingness to exercise higher degree 
of transparency. Throughout the years, the situation has been improved to some extent as a 
result of the huge efforts made by the national stock market regulators, the stock exchanges 
and the national authorities. These issues are gaining increasing attention and numerous 
authors have contributed toward the clarification of the specifics of transparency and cor-
porate governance in this setting (Berglöf & Pajuste, 2005). Djankov and Murrell (2002) 
among other things, find that privatisation to outsiders has the most positive effects on 
corporate restructuring. Filatotchev, Wright, Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, and Hoskisson (2003) 
conclude that insider ownership resulting from the processes of privatisation has had det-
rimental impact on the learning capabilities of the companies and their organisational 
restructuring capacity. Korent, Đunđek, and Čalopa (2014) find a positive impact of the 
quality of corporate governance on the overall success of the companies included in the 
CROBEX stock market index.
Nowadays, the companies in these countries seem to show considerable differences in 
terms of their transparency levels. For the purposes of our study, we have tried to quan-
tify these levels for the companies in four Balkan countries, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and 
Macedonia, using a sample of 145 companies and applying Standard & Poor’s (S&P) meth-
odology. Afterwards, on the basis of these scores, we apply a regression analysis in which 
we test for the relevance and the impact that certain variables have on the transparency of 
these companies.
In the first section of the paper we make a brief review of the publicised research on the 
relationship between transparency and certain company attributes. The second section con-
tains an elaboration of the methodology of research. The empirical results of the regression 
run on the sample of companies are presented in the third section, after which, the main 
findings are summarised in the conclusion.
2. Literature review
The abovementioned findings on the benefits and costs from transparency and disclosure 
(T.D.) have become a part of the publicly available body of knowledge on corporate gov-
ernance, but we still witness significantly variable patterns of behaviour from the company 
managers around the world.
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Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) make one of the earliest attempts to explore the deter-
minants of voluntary disclosure, using a sample of Mexican firms and firm size, financial 
leverage and proportion of assets in place as independent variables. The study only finds a 
significant positive relationship between firm size and disclosure.
Durnev and Kim (2005) find that firms with broader growth opportunities and a higher 
need for external financing choose better governance and disclosure practices. This is espe-
cially true in countries with weaker legal protection. The companies in these countries 
try to bridge the gap between themselves and the potential investors created by the legal 
uncertainty, through the use of enhanced disclosure practices.
The paper by Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) is one of the early attempts to explore the deter-
minants of corporate transparency in the post-transition economies of C.E.E. They make 
a cross-country analysis of the level of voluntary disclosure to test their hypotheses and 
conclude that despite the country differences, higher transparency is exhibited by compa-
nies with large controlling owners, less leveraged firms, larger firms, slower growth firms 
and firms with higher market-to-book ratios. Contrary to Durnev and Kim (2005), they 
don’t find a support for the hypothesis that companies that need more external financing 
voluntarily disclose more.
Another useful contribution for the emerging markets is the paper by Hanifa and Rashid 
(2005). They use a sample of 100 Malaysian companies and find support for the positive 
relationship between transparency and size, growth prospects of the company, leverage 
and concentrated ownership. They also prove that the companies with significant foreign 
ownership are more transparent as a result of the need to provide more information to the 
distant shareholders.
Trabelsi, Labelle, and Dumontier (2008) explore the determinants of transparency using 
a sample of Canadian companies. They apply an innovated procedure, considering only 
disclosure provided through company websites as voluntary. They find positive relationship 
between corporate transparency and the liquidity of their shares, the expected performance 
of the firm and the level of its R&D expenditures and a negative impact of the level of 
market competition.
Aksu and Espahbodi (2016) investigate the behaviour of the companies listed on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange to determine if mandatory or voluntary regulation provides better 
results in terms of disclosure quality. They find out that the mandatory implementation 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (I.F.R.S.) have had positive impact on the 
T.D. practices of the Turkish firms. Marginally positive impact of the I.F.R.S. adoption on 
disclosure has been found by Bokpin (2013) in his study on the capital market of Ghana. 
According to this study, firm size, financial leverage, age of the company, its profitability and 
the audit quality have been found to be significant firm level characteristics determining 
corporate disclosure.
Mendes-Da-Silva and Onusic (2014) analyse the link between certain firm characteristics 
and the web-based disclosure which is taking prevalence over other methods of disclosing 
data and changing the entire disclosure ambiance. Although the size of the company and 
the acceptance of best corporate governance practices have proven their expected positive 
impact on transparency, somewhat surprising outcome has been the negative impact of the 
length of the period of company listing on the stock exchange.
In a more recent study, Ahmed (2015) explores the determinants of the quality of dis-
closed earnings in ten European transition economies. He finds significant cross-country 
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differences of the relevant factors, where the ownership structure plays important role in 
determining the quality of disclosure in most transparent countries, while financial factors 
are a more significant determinant in the countries with poorer disclosure practices.
Although these findings to some extent contradict each other, on the basis of the exist-
ing literature we can make a general conclusion that the companies with large controlling 
ownerships, larger firms and companies with higher growth prospects are more willing to 
disclose.
3. Methodology
3.1. Measuring the level of transparency
In order to find if there are any variables that have a systematic impact on the level of trans-
parency, we need an appropriate measure for the level of T.D. which is needed to serve as 
a dependent variable. There is no exact quantitative measure for this purpose, so we have 
checked into the existing literature for the possible candidates.
The first problem that the researchers face is related to finding an appropriate measure of 
something which is not directly quantifiable and consists of multiple components of various 
kinds. Two general approaches have been suggested to overcome this problem. The first 
approach is based on subjective valuation, using the opinions of experts organised in panels. 
The second approach focuses on individual observation of the disclosure practices of the 
corporations. This is mostly done through the examination of their publicised information.
The second problem is related to the determination of the quality of transparency. 
Namely, the mere publicising of information might be a result of mandatory rules, rather 
than a voluntary disclosure for the sake of improving corporate governance. Although 
this disclosure is beneficial to the general public, it is not an indication of the company’s 
awareness or willingness to disclose.
In order to increase the objectivity of the assessment, we employ the latter approach 
(observation of corporate disclosure) and try to determine a particular indicator of corporate 
transparency. An early version of such an indicator is the disclosure score, published by 
the U.S.-based Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (C.I.F.A.R.) until 
1995. Other examples of such applications can be found in Hail (2002), who uses a system 
of measurement to determine the level of voluntary disclosure by Swiss firms, Durnev and 
Kim (2005), who use the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (C.L.S.A.) assessment of the qual-
ity of corporate governance, or Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) who use both the information 
disclosed on company websites and the information contained in the companies’ annual 
reports to construct a WebDisclosure Index as a measure of voluntary disclosure, and 
another – ARDisclosure Index – to evaluate the implementation of mandatory disclosure. 
Boubaker, Lakhal, and Nekhili (2012) develop a set of their own transparency indexes in 
a similar manner. Sharif and Ming Lai (2015) use a modified transparency and disclosure 
index based on 22 disclosure items. The index is basically a binary scoring system (it gives 
the items values of 0 or 1), but they also apply decimal scoring (values between 0 and 1).
One of the most comprehensive systems for measuring transparency was devised by 
S&P. It is based on a list of 98 items, which have to be checked if they are made available by 
the company. Patel and Dallas (2002) have applied this method in a study that examines 
the transparency and disclosure practices of many companies from all the continents. The 
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total number of points for a company represents the particular company’s score and pro-
vides a basis for comparisons among companies, countries and regions, but they have also 
served as useful inputs in numerous other studies (Durnev & Kim, 2005; Khanna, Palepu, 
& Srinivasan, 2004) for a robustness check, etc. The weaknesses of the S&P’s T.D. scores 
are that they fail to distinguish between voluntary and mandatory disclosures and do not 
provide an indication of the quality of the disclosed data and processes (Khanna et al., 2004).
3.2. Survey design and data
We have based our study on the determinants of corporate T.D. on a sample of compa-
nies from four post-transition economies: Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Macedonia. To 
the best of our knowledge, there has not been any research on the disclosure practices for 
the countries in this region. These countries have a lot in common. They belonged to same 
country until 1990, they shared the same economic system (socialist self-management), 
they all went through a process of privatisation, they all suffered similar economic, politi-
cal and other turbulences during the 1990s, their economies are relatively small, etc. In all 
these countries the privatisation process was mainly based on domestic resources and the 
inflows from foreign investments have been negligible. As a result of these developments, 
the capital markets are predominantly bank-centred with stock exchanges suffering from a 
lack of liquidity, relatively few new equity offerings and occasional corporate bond issues.
Our sample includes companies traded on the national stock exchanges of these coun-
tries, both listed and not-listed (the definition of a listed company varies widely among 
these markets). The final sample consists of 35 Slovenian (mostly listed) companies, 44 
Macedonian listed companies, 34 Croatian companies (from the official market) and 32 
Serbian companies (prime and standard listing and ordinary market), accounting for a total 
of 145 companies. The global structure of the sample by industry is given in Table 1. These 
companies represent considerable portions of the total turnover in the respective stock 
markets, ranging between 40% in Serbia to 98% in Slovenia. We emphasise the relation of 
the companies with the stock market, because transparency is an issue of highest impor-
tance for the current and potential shareholders. Although the companies were selected 
randomly, the sample includes only companies with higher stock market turnovers. Due to 
the insufficient representation of the various industries in the sample, we do not investigate 
any industry impacts, but we differentiate between financial and non-financial companies 
in the robustness check.
To obtain the necessary data, we have reviewed the websites of these companies in detail. 
The T.D. scores were manually calculated through a thorough examination of the publicly 
disclosed data on the basis of the S&P checklist. The checklist contains 98 items classified 
into three broad areas: (1) ownership structure, (2) financial matters and (3) board and 
Table 1. structure of the companies in the sample.
source: authors.
Industry Slovenia Croatia Serbia Macedonia
manufacturing 17 21 23 25
Financial (banking and insurance) 5 7 6 7
other services 13 6 3 12
totaL 35 34 32 44
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management composition and processes.1 The company is given a point for every particular 
item from the list that has been made publicly available in a reasonable manner (not requir-
ing extraordinary I.T. knowledge). The mandatory disclosures made on other institutional 
websites (securities and exchange commissions (S.E.C.s), stock exchanges, etc.) were not 
taken into account in order to obtain an indicator of the purely voluntary transparency and 
the attitudes of the companies toward disclosing information to the public. The examination 
was done during 2014. The financial information was taken from their audited financial 
statements for the period 2011–2013, prepared according to the I.F.R.S. The financial data 
were converted to euros, using the corresponding exchange rates.
The aggregate results from the survey are presented in Table 2. The T.D. scores by area are 
calculated as a proportion of the disclosure items from the S&P list which have been made 
publicly available by the company. The scores by area and the total scores by country are cal-
culated as averages. The other lines in this table contain information regarding the presence 
on the corporate websites of several disclosure items we have found particularly indicative.
The comparison among the analysed countries can be easily made from the given data. 
It is interesting to note that the T.D. scores by country increase as we move from the east 
to the west, but also they increase in line with the level of economic development of the 
country and its European Union (E.U.) membership status.
The differences in the levels of transparency among the countries can be better under-
stood if we look at the national legal frameworks related to the functioning of the stock 
markets and the issuers’ reporting obligations. The stock exchanges in all the analysed 
countries were founded in the 1990s during the process of mass privatisation, i.e., transition 
into market economies. The trading in all of them is done in several market segments. The 
reporting requirements differ by segment and it seems that the companies have not been very 
eager to list on the highest segments and thus conform to the toughest disclosure standards. 
The number of listed companies in the first markets in 2013 has been 8 in Slovenia, 10 in 
Serbia, 23 in Croatia and 29 in Macedonia (excluding the mandatory listed companies).
The reporting requirements slightly differ by country. The regulations in Slovenia and 
Croatia explicitly follow the E.U. Directives related to transparency and capital markets. In 
Slovenia, the Guidelines on Disclosure for Listed Companies not only stipulate the publi-
cation of Annual Reports, but they also prescribe its content. In Croatia the same matter 
is regulated by the Law on Securities and the corresponding bylaws. In Serbia, the Law on 
Capital Markets requires that all the publicly traded companies are obliged to prepare and 
publish Annual Reports, while in Macedonia the same issue is regulated by a S.E.C.’s bylaw. 
Table 2. transparency and disclosure scores and crucial disclosure items.
source: authors.
Area of disclosure Slovenia Croatia Serbia Macedonia
ownership structure and investor rights 54.6 43.8 43.8 27.1
Financial transparency 61.4 54.5 43.7 35.1
Board process and structure 32.4 16.7 9.6 9.8
composite score (weighted average) 49.2 38.1 31.8 23.9
average stake owned by top 3 shareholders 61.2% 64.9% 69.5% 55.2%
investor relations section on the website 97% 73% 90% 64%
annual report on the website 97% 67% 36% 39%
annual report in English 66% 40% 12% 23%
Reproduction of the auditors’ report 94% 93% 90% 82%
information about management compensation 94% 39% 26% 20%
no. of companies in the sample 35 34 32 44
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In all of these countries it is required that the Annual Report contains information about the 
company operations and plans for the future, in addition to the audited financial reports. 
In Serbia, it is positive that the conditions for listing require that the company maintains 
an updated website, which regardless of seeming redundant in the twenty-first century, is 
still not customary in the region. We can see from Table 2 that although regulations exist 
in all these countries, the companies behave in different manners. In Slovenia almost all of 
the analysed companies prepare comprehensive annual reports, while in Macedonia and 
Serbia they mostly stick to the financial information.
3.3. Development of the regression model
From the existing literature in this field we have made a selection of variables most often 
considered as possible determinants of transparency and narrowed the choice down to the 
ones that we find most appropriate for the economies in the sample.
Transparency and disclosure score. This is the dependent variable in the model. It was 
calculated manually, for every particular company in the sample, in the manner described 
above.
Size of the company. Larger companies are expected to be more transparent, either 
because they are better able to cover the costs of transparency (Ashbaugh, Johnstone, & 
Warfield, 1999; Buzby, 1975), or because they have a larger shareholders’ base, so that they 
use disclosure as a tool to reduce agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Debreceny, Gray, 
and Rahman (2002) find a positive relationship between the size of the company and its 
I.F.R. practices, while Hanifa and Rashid (2005) draw the same conclusion in the case of 
the Malaysian companies. Lang and Lundholm (1993), Eng and Mak (2003), Boubaker 
et al. (2012) have also found support for this hypothesis. We use two proxies to measure 
size: total assets and total sales of the company, both measured in their natural log forms 
(ln(assets) and ln(sales)).
External capital dependence. One of the reasons the companies need to be transparent 
is to increase their chances of providing external financing in the form of issuing public 
securities. This is especially true when the companies are in their growth phase and the 
profits they generate are insufficient to cover their investment needs. One of the earliest 
attempts to explore the link between the additional financing needs and the transparency 
of the company is found in Lang and Lundholm (1993). Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) and 
Durnev and Kim (2005) also expect the companies in a greater need for external financing 
to disclose more in order to attract additional investors.
However, in our case we are a bit susceptible as to the expected sign of this variable 
because of the differences in the financing patterns between the companies in this region 
and their western counterparts. All the economies in the sample are heavily bank-oriented 
and the companies mostly rely on bank financing. Since the banks as creditors have access 
to all the needed information, the borrowing companies are not provoked to disclose their 
financial data for this purpose. This kind of behaviour has been confirmed in the case of 
French listed firms by Boubaker et al. (2012) and for the Taiwanese companies by Yang, 
Han, and Sheu (2008).
To proxy this variable, we use the approach applied by Durnev and Kim (2005), meas-
uring the difference between the firm’s actual growth rate and its sustainable growth rate. 
As proposed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), the firm’s actual growth rate is 
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estimated as a 2-year geometric mean of the annual growth rates of its total assets, and the 
sustainable growth rate as a 2-year geometric mean of the expression R.O.E./(1 − R.O.E.). 
In order to enhance the robustness of the results, we apply 3-year means for the above 
variables. This proxy is denoted as EXT_FIN in the regression.
Company performance. This variable is expected to reflect the efficiency of the company, 
on the basis of its profitability or growth rates. Better performing firms should be more 
inclined toward disclosing their situation to the public (Clarkson, Kao, & Richardson, 1994). 
Higher profitability is expected to increase the market valuation of the company. Also, the 
announcement of good financial performance enables the company to attract more external 
capital. However, this is only weakly supported in Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) and not found 
significant by Hanifa and Rashid (2005), while the growth prospects are found to have a 
significantly positive relationship with transparency in Debreceny et al. (2002). We use two 
proxies: return on assets (R.O.A.) and return on equity (R.O.E.). In order to overcome the 
problem of the variability of these ratios throughout the years, we apply 3-year geometric 
means of these variables in our analysis.
Concentration of ownership. The ownership over the joint-stock companies may differ 
in terms of the number of shareholders, the division of shareholders by country of origin, 
the existence of a dominant shareholder, etc. It has an impact on the overall quality of the 
corporate governance in the company. The companies with highly concentrated ownership 
should not be very eager (or interested) to disclose more, since all the most relevant owners 
would have an easy access to all the relevant information. This expectation is augmented by 
the low legal protection of shareholders’ rights which is characteristic for all the economies 
in the early stages of development of their capital markets. On the other hand, in cases 
of dispersed ownership higher transparency helps reduce agency costs and information 
asymmetry. The results of Mckinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), Oyelere, Laswad, and Fisher 
(2003), Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) and Boubaker et al. (2012), among others, confirm this 
hypothesis. Eng and Mak (2003) find that significant government ownership and lower 
managerial ownership should result in higher corporate transparency. This variable can be 
expressed in many different ways: the percentage of shares owned by the largest sharehold-
ers; the number of shareholders whose total stake equals 50% of the company’s shares; the 
ownership share of foreign investors, etc. In countries with recently privatised economies, 
there are also the issues of insider ownership, disguised ownership, etc.
The proxies we apply for this variable take two forms: the first is the total percentage of 
ownership held by the largest shareholder (TOP1), while in the alternative form, we use 
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 when the three largest shareholders own more 
than 50% of the voting shares and a value of zero otherwise (OWN_D).
Leverage, indebtedness of the company. Some of the studies include the ratio of overall 
debt to assets a probable determinant of transparency. Eng and Mak (2003) find an inverse 
relationship between leverage and transparency, while Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) find this 
variable as insignificant. We expect a negative impact of leverage on disclosure, having 
in mind the mentality of the local managers. Namely, because of reasons of vanity, the 
managers of debt-burdened companies might not be willing to disclose that to the public. 
We must also have in mind that the T.D. scores include not only financial, but also many 
other aspects of disclosure. The proxy we use for this variable is the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets (LEVER).
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Country of origin. In studies in which companies from several countries are involved, 
the impact of the country of origin of the companies needs to be assessed. We have seen 
from Table 2 that the countries differ with respect to the T.D. levels, so we want to test this 
through the regression model, as well. For this purpose, a country dummy is included, in 
which, Macedonia is taken as a basis because of the lowest average T.D. score, meaning 
that actually three country variables are used (Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) and the values 
obtained for these variables show their impact on the T.D. scores relative to the Macedonian 
companies. In addition, to test the importance of the E.U. membership, we have included 
the E.U. dummy variable in the last model (5), which takes the value of 1 if a company 
comes from an E.U. member country and 0 otherwise. Note that this variable is not used 
at the same time with the country variable.
To test the predicted relationship between corporate transparency and firm attributes, we 
regress individual firms’ T.D. scores on measures of size, external financing needs, company 
performance, ownership concentration, leverage and country. Specifically, we estimate the 
following cross-sectional regression in its general form:
where TDS is the estimated transparency score, α is the intercept, SIZE is the size of the 
company, EXTFIN the need for external financing, PERF is company performance, OWN the 
concentration of ownership, LEVER leverage, indebtedness of the company, ci the country 
dummy, j the company and n the number of countries (i.e., 4).
On the basis of this general form, we develop several alternative regression specifications. 
The variations refer to the interchangeable use of the assets and sales variables as proxies 
for size and the use of a percentage amount or a dummy variable to proxy for ownership 
concentration. We apply ordinary least squares (O.L.S.) technique to this model, following 
the approach of Berglöf and Pajuste (2005), Boubaker et al. (2012), etc.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
The descriptive statistics, given in Table 3, indicate somewhat higher skewness of R.O.E., 
so we use this variable only in the first model. The reason for this is the fact that there are 
several companies with no or even negative equity capital. We can see that the average 
profitability of the companies is rather low (mean 3-year R.O.A. = 1%). The ownership is 
relatively highly concentrated with mean of about 62% and median of 64% for the stake of 
the three largest shareholders.
4.2. Regression results
The results of the regression run in five variations (models 1–5) are presented in Table 4. 
We have run several models to test the relevance of the same variables using different 
proxies. The regression results of all the five models are unambiguous. They show that the 
transparency of the company is positively influenced by its size, while the concentration 
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of ownership and the leverage have a negative impact. These relationships are very strong 
and significant at least at the 5% level, regardless of the proxy used. The ownership con-
centration sign is in line with the theory on asymmetric information and according to our 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
source: authors.
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
TDS 35.86 35.00 77.00 0.00 15.23 −0.02 3.40
Ln(assets) 11.36 11.26 16.61 6.88 1.91 0.39 2.82
Ln(sales) 10.59 10.47 15.19 5.34 1.91 0.01 2.74
R.o.a. 0.01 0.01 0.30 −0.21 0.07 0.07 6.21
R.o.E. 0.02 0.03 0.67 −0.80 0.25 −2.38 10.38
LEvER 0.38 0.36 0.98 0.02 0.26 0.41 2.10
EXt_Fin 0.91 1.23 52.39 −71.83 13.07 −0.51 10.96
toP1 45.20 41.00 100.00 5.70 27.37 0.43 2.05
oWn_D 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.47 −0.68 1.47
hRv 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.42 1.25 2.57
sRB 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.42 1.34 2.81
sLo 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.43 1.21 2.46
E.U. 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.09 1.01
Table 4. Regression results – determinants of transparency and disclosure.





MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
intercept −1.687 −1.452 −7.236 6.732 6.350
(6.148) (6.054) (6.981) (6.113) (6.083)
Ln(assets) 3.203*** 4.066***
(0.546) (0.560)




R.o.E. −7.856* −0.269 −2.650
(4.592) (4.299) (4.490)
LEvER −7.884* −4.045 −0.852 −7.29* −9.844**
(4.300) (3.983) (4.538) (3.92) (4.076)
EXt_Fin −0.143* −0.143* −0.166* −0.175** −0.167**
(0.068) (0.080) (0.091) (0.079) (0.083)












observations 145 145 145 145 145
adj R2 0.307 0.475 0.292 0.426 0.385
D.W. 1.80 2.01 1.517 2.06 1.92
a.i.c. 7.96 7.70 7.979 7.79 7.85
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expectations, the companies with more concentrated ownership do not feel the need or the 
pressure to disclose more.
Our findings correspond with those of most of the similar studies. Berglöf and Pajuste 
(2005) is perhaps the most appropriate case for comparisons since it also uses a sample 
of countries from C.E.E. They also find that larger firms and firms with less concentrated 
ownership are more transparent, while regarding the impact of leverage, they find no sig-
nificance. Boubaker et al. (2012) using a sample of French companies find positive rela-
tionship between size and negative relationship between concentration of ownership and 
transparency. The same result regarding the size variable was obtained by Patel and Dallas 
(2002) and Hanifa and Rashid (2005).
Additional significant findings are that the Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian companies 
are more transparent than their Macedonian counterparts, which was an expected outcome, 
having in mind the calculated average T.D. scores by country. Additionally, the regression 
coefficients for these countries illustrate the respective overall T.D. scores given in Table 
2. Model 5 also indicates that the companies from the E.U. countries have higher average 
T.D. scores than their non-E.U. counterparts.
In line with our expectations, the companies with higher leverage are less likely to be 
transparent. Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) reach the same conclusion, while Hanifa and Rashid 
(2005) obtain an opposite outcome. However, the companies with higher needs for external 
financing are also less transparent, which is to some extent inconsistent with our expecta-
tions. This finding can be explained with the practice of predominant bank financing and 
the infrequent practice of issuing securities.
The variables related to profitability have been found to be insignificant. In addition to 
their skewness (R.O.E.), this corresponds to our expectation that the companies in bank-ori-
ented economies understand the capital markets in a way different from their peers in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. As mentioned above, in the previous studies, such as Berglöf and 
Pajuste (2005) and Hanifa and Rashid (2005) there has been only weak support for this 
variable, as well.
Testing the alternative model specifications, we find that best fit is provided when the 
country dummies are included, proving that the country of origin has a strong impact 
on the corporate behaviour related to transparency. This is confirmed by the value of the 
adjusted coefficient of determination and the lower Akaike information criterion (A.I.C.) 
compared to the other models.
4.3. Robustness check
In order to check the robustness of the results obtained, we have run the regression with 
several modifications. For the purposes of differentiation, the results of these regressions are 
presented in models named with letters (from A to E). The first one refers to the exclusion 
of the financial institutions and its results are presented in the first column (model A). The 
rationale behind the first modification is that the financial institutions (banks and insur-
ance companies) are subject to specific mandatory disclosure requirements, so that their 
inclusion in the sample might cause an upward bias in the T.D. scores, but also because their 
financial statements significantly differ from those of the non-finance companies which 
might distort some of the variables used in the regressions, such as leverage or the need for 
external financing. In models B and C we differentiate between companies originating from 
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the E.U. member states (Slovenia and Croatia) and those which are not in the E.U. (Serbia 
and Macedonia). These tests are based on the premise that there could be a difference in 
the transparency levels among the companies because of the application of the European 
directives and codes related to corporate governance. The last two tests refer to the size of 
the companies. For this purpose, we have divided the sample into two subsamples according 
to the size of the company, measured by the natural log of sales. The purpose of these tests 
is to check if the relevant variables remain significant regardless of the size of the company.
In these tests, we intentionally reduce the number of alternative proxies for the same 
variables, to simplify the interpretation of the results.
The results of these regressions are given in Table 5.
The results of the robustness check encourage us to claim that the relationships derived 
from the regression analysis are stable and reliable. We can see that the size, leverage, 
concentration of ownership and country of origin variables are significant in most of the 
models, with the exception of the ownership variable in the case of the smaller companies. 
However, model C which is applied to non-E.U. companies, does not provide sufficient 
evidence regarding the need for external financing and leverage as determinants, while in 
the other models the level of significance of the variables is reduced. It can be attributed to 
the smaller sample size in these cases. This, coupled with the lower coefficient of determi-
nation in the last four models, reassures us that it was a correct approach to create a sample 
covering companies from all the four countries.
Table 5. Robustness check.












Model D Larger 
½ companies
Model E Smaller 
½ companies
intercept 6.522 11.531 10.535 −2.827 12.896
(6.385) (9.837) (8.743) (14.001) (7.974)
Ln(sales) 2.571*** 3.807*** 2.465*** 3.691*** 0.817*
(0.671) (0.836) (0.920) (1.201) (0.418)
R.o.E. 3.819 −2.706 −2.593 −1.615 −7.068
(6.261) (4.863) (10.86) (5.418) (22.905)
LEvER −4.159 −11.287** −9.992 −9.256** −7.269*
(4.914) (5.398) (6.531) (5.501) (4.082)
EXt_Fin −0.288*** −0.247* −0.126 −0.071 −0.177
(0.100) (0.139) (0.110) (0.124) (0.110)
toP1 −0.119*** −0.148*** −0.100** −0.127** −0.034
(0.044) (0.055) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054)
sLo 17.761*** 19.904*** 15.721***
(3.111) (4.95) (3.653)
cRo 10.082*** 8.457* 13.497**
(3.307) (4.447) (5.422)
sRB 8.434*** 6.630 6.812**
(3.005) (5.217) (3.147)
observations 120 69 76 73 72
adj R2 0.456 0.29 0.08 0.39 0.27
D.W. 2.01 1.79 1.96 1.83 2.21
a.i.c. 7.79 7.79 7.97 7.93 7.70
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5. Conclusions
The transparency and disclosure scores, as well as the regression results clearly indicate 
that the countries with closer links to the west have reached higher levels of corporate 
transparency. Obviously, the level of economic development and the E.U. membership 
positively affect the transparency and disclosure patterns of the companies. We link this 
to the adoption of the E.U. Directives and we would support the implementation of these 
rules as a step toward improving the overall corporate governance practices. The differ-
ence among the countries also suggests that the companies operating in larger and more 
developed markets feel stronger incentives to be transparent than those from the smaller 
economies. That could be an additional impetus to intensify the process of integration of 
the stock exchanges in a common trading platform, which would more directly expose the 
companies to a larger investing public.
The T.D. assessment also reveals that the companies have earned highest scores in the 
financial information segment, which is somewhat surprising because of the nature of the 
data it covers. It could be attributed to the adoption of the I.F.R.S. in all these countries, 
which makes us conclude that the enforcement of certain rules could be beneficial when 
the spontaneous processes do not bring the expected results. This outcome and conclusion 
are in line with the findings of Patel and Dallas (2002) and Aksu and Kosedag (2006).
The regression analysis gives unambiguous results regarding the determinants of cor-
porate transparency in the analysed countries. It has shown that the larger companies and 
those with more widespread ownership are more transparent. They confirm that in the 
post-transition economies the larger companies are more willing or better able to disclose, 
even though the regulations are the same for all the companies. Also, companies with one 
or several dominant shareholders either find it not necessary to be transparent or they 
intentionally refrain from revealing too much information to the public.
The results of the study are in great deal consistent with those of similar studies, even 
with those implemented in developed economies (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Berglöf & Pajuste, 
2005; Debreceny et al., 2002; Hanifa & Rashid, 2005; etc.). We must note that it is a little 
difficult to find directly comparable studies, because of the fast changing environment 
of corporate disclosure as a result of the unprecedented trend of advances in the field of 
information technologies.
Our general conclusion is that the transparent behaviour of the companies in the 
post-transition period is mostly a result of objective factors (size, model of privatisation, 
overall economic development, capital market development, legislation, etc.), rather than 
a thoughtful assessment of the company of its upcoming funding requirements. The insig-
nificance of the profitability variable and the negative sign of the need for external financ-
ing indicate the low level of importance of the capital markets when they are illiquid and 
inefficient. That, however, places higher burden on the governments to look for appropriate 
measures to stimulate or impose the implementation of the best practices in this field, which 
is supported in other papers, as well (Aksu & Espahbodi, 2016; Berglöf & Pajuste, 2005; 
Beekes, Brown, & Zhang, 2015; Östberg, 2006; Satta, Parola, Profumo, & Penco, 2015).
This is the first study that explores the issue of transparency and its determinants in the 
post-transition economies using a sample covering several Balkan countries and a compre-
hensive measure of transparency and disclosure. It is particularly valuable that the sample 
used is international, but still consisting of companies from economies sharing the same 
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background and which have undergone different processes of transition in the last two and 
a half decades. This gives the opportunity to determine how different paths of development 
could have affected the corporate governance practices of these countries and also to derive 
recommendations that would be transferrable to other similar economies. We also hope 
that this paper will inspire a widespread use of the applied T.D. scoring system on a regional 
basis, which would open an opportunity for making comparisons and thus influence the 
companies to improve their T.D. practices.
Among the limitations of this study are the size of the sample and the short period that 
it covers. The size of the economies in question limits the number of relevant companies to 
be analysed. Additional studies should try to extend the research to other countries in the 
region and broader, but useful insights could be also deduced from studying the change in 
disclosure practices over time. Also, the increased number of companies per industry would 
provide basis for analysis of the impact of the industry variable. Another avenue for research 
could be to inspect the impact of factors such as the level of capital market development or 
company valuation on transparency, but under the current levels of low market turnover, 
such studies might remain ill-founded. Finally, the possibilities and media for disclosure 
rapidly change, so that future research would have to take these in mind.
Note
1.  A more detailed description of the procedure can be found in Patel and Dallas (2002)
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